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Abstract—As the complexity of cyber-attacks keeps increasing, 
new and more robust detection mechanisms need to be developed. 
The next generation of Intrusion Detection Systems (IDSs) should 
be able to adapt their detection characteristics based not only on 
the measureable network traffic, but also on the available high-
level information related to the protected network to improve their 
detection results. We make use of the Pattern-of-Life (PoL) of a 
network as the main source of high-level information, which is 
correlated with the time of the day and the usage of the network 
resources. We propose the use of a Fuzzy Cognitive Map (FCM) to 
incorporate the PoL into the detection process. The main aim of 
this work is to evidence the improved the detection performance 
of an IDS using an FCM to leverage on network related contextual 
information. The results that we present verify that the proposed 
method improves the effectiveness of our IDS by reducing the total 
number of false alarms; providing an improvement of 9.68% when 
all the considered metrics are combined and a peak improvement 
of up to 35.64%, depending on particular metric combination. 
Keywords— Contextual Information; Dempster-Shafer Theory; 
Fuzzy Cognitive Maps; Intrusion Detection Systems; Network 
Security; Pattern-of-Life; Port Scanning Attack 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Cyber-security has increasing importance to Internet users. 
Therefore, providing strong and reliable security mechanisms 
has become essential in all areas of society, but it becomes 
especially critical in the context of networked national security, 
as parts of its core infrastructure are constantly targeted by 
cyber-attacks. The implementation of monitoring tools, such as 
Intrusion Detection Systems (IDSs), is fundamental in security 
infrastructures in order to provide extra level of assurance, 
identifying evidence of attacks or intrusion attempts. Great effort 
has been made by researchers in the area of network security to 
increase the effectiveness of the IDSs. However, network 
systems are still victims of cyber-attacks. 
Current IDSs make use only of measurable network traffic 
information from the protected system or signatures of known 
cyber-attacks during the intrusion detection process, but these 
systems do not take generally into account available high-level 
information (i.e. above the network operation) regarding the 
protected system [1]. As we previously discussed in [2], the next 
generation of IDSs should incorporate contextual information, 
situational awareness and cognitive information, pertaining to 
the experts’ judgment on the network behaviour within the 
intrusion detection process. Ideally, IDSs should be able to adapt 
their detection characteristics based not only on the measureable 
network traffic, but also on the context in which these systems 
operate, and the information provided by the network users. 
In this work we have made use of the Pattern-of-Life (PoL) 
[3] of the network usage as the main source of high-level 
information. The PoL of the network is directly correlated with 
the number of users accessing the Internet. The presence of 
network users could be correlated with the time of the day and 
the usage of the network resources to generate useful contextual 
information. This information could, in turn, be used by our IDS 
to improve its detection results. 
In order to incorporate the PoL into the detection process, a 
Fuzzy Cognitive Map (FCM) [4] can be used in conjunction with 
our anomaly-based IDS. An FCM provides a useful framework 
to represent the behaviour of a system and to calculate the degree 
of influence that one event or action may have upon the whole 
system and upon parts of the system. In this paper, we extend 
the analysis of this approach that we previously proposed in [2], 
by using more realistic network measurements, and a novel 
scheme to construct the FCM design. The FCM is used to fine-
tune some of the techniques used by our IDS, with the main 
objective of improving the detection results. The experimental 
analysis evidences the improved detection performance of an 
IDS using an FCM to leverage network related context. 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. In Section II 
the most relevant previous work is reviewed. The detection 
methodology used by our IDS is explained in Section III. In 
Section IV, a description of an FCM is provided and the 
proposed approach for the use of an FCM within an IDS is 
described. The network testbed and the network traffic 
measurements that compose the analysed dataset, as well as the 
implemented attacks are described in Section V. Section VI 
describes the experiment results. Finally, conclusions and 
suggestions for future work are given in Section VII. 
II. RELATED WORK 
Future IDSs need to detect intelligently network attacks, not 
only by using measurable information from the network, but also 
integrating contextual information into the detection process. 
The authors of [5] present an extensive and very detailed survey 
about current research on context-based information fusion 
systems. This work explains that data fusion systems that use 
contextual information to improve the quality of the fused output 
have gained importance in the last few years. It also emphasises 
that contextual information should be an important asset at any 
level of modern fusion systems. 
This work was supported by the Engineering and Physical Sciences 
Research Council (EPSRC) Grant number EP/K014307/2 and the MOD 
University Defence Research Collaboration in Signal Processing. 
In [6], the authors proposed an IDS that relies on contextual 
information to classify the alerts as relevant or irrelevant. The 
IDS makes use of contextual information about hosts present in 
the network and known vulnerabilities. Although the results 
show improvement in the effectiveness of the IDSs, this is a 
supervised system, and its performance depends on a chosen 
threshold, which is selected after a number of runs. 
Ontologies have also proven to be powerful tools to specify 
and structure knowledge, to represent behaviours schematically, 
or to provide formal specification of different entities in a system 
and their relationships. For instance, the authors of [1] propose 
a security ontologies-based approach to add context information 
into a process that fuses the outcome of heterogeneous 
distributed IDSs. By using this high-level information, the 
authors are able to reduce the number of false positive alerts. 
All these techniques have proven to increase the efficiency 
of different systems. However, in contrast to FCM, none of these 
techniques is able to model the influence of the different 
states/events in the overall system. FCMs have been previously 
described and used in [4, 7] to model human knowledge, 
together with new and unseen behaviours of particular scenarios. 
The authors of [4] provide a detailed description of the FCM and 
its mathematical foundation. The authors in [7] provide a 
detailed description of an FCM and examples that use an FCM 
to model fault propagation in interconnected systems. 
The work presented in [8] focuses on developing an 
actionable model of situation awareness for army infantry 
platoon leaders that could replicate human cognition using 
FCMs. Their FCM is designed based on a goals submap, a tree-
like diagram that structures the goals and subgoals of the 
platoon, and the relationships between these goals. One of the 
characteristics of the FCM presented in [8] is that the people 
responsible for designing the FCM do not provide weight values 
to the modelled concepts, but rank the importance of each 
concept. A similar approach is presented in [9], in which 
situation awareness is represented using an FCM. 
In [10], the authors describe a knowledge acquisition system 
that systematically acquires design knowledge from multiple 
experts and constructs an FCM. The authors of [11] highlight the 
time consuming issues related to the manual construction of 
large FCMs. In order to solve these issues, the authors present a 
framework to semi-automate the construction of FCMs using 
information from a database and other sources of information. 
In [12], the authors use an FCM to model causal knowledge 
within network data. Based on this knowledge, their system 
calculates the severity/relevance of the modelled network data 
to attacks. This approach would allow their IDS to discard 
irrelevant events and focus only on important ones. However, in 
contrast to the approach that we propose, this research does not 
use an FCM to modify parameters in the detection process, but 
as an events filtering process prior to the actual detection. 
III. INTRUSION DETECTION METHODOLOGY 
As many researchers have previously demonstrated [13, 14], 
the combined use of multiple metrics from the same or different 
network stack layers may result in higher Detection Rate (DR) 
with lower numbers of false alarms for an IDS. The higher the 
number of metrics used, the greater the chances to identify the 
presence of attack. Therefore, we use a cross-layer approach, 
using multiple metrics to carry out the detection process. Our 
IDS uses the Dempster-Shafer (D-S) Theory of Evidence to 
combine the evidence from the different metrics. 
A. Dempster-Shafer Theory of Evidence 
D-S is a data fusion technique that combines evidence of 
information from multiple and heterogeneous events in order to 
calculate the belief of occurrence of another event. D-S theory 
starts by defining a frame of discernment Θ = {θ1, θ2,..., θn}, 
which is the finite set of all possible mutually exclusive 
outcomes of a particular problem domain. Assuming Θ has two 
outcomes {A, N}, the total number of hypotheses that Θ 
composes is 2Θ = {A, N, {A|N}, Ø}. In the case of {A|N}, this 
subset corresponds to Uncertainty (either A or N). In addition, 
the empty set Ø is always equal 0. Each hypothesis is assigned a 
belief value within the range [0, 1], also known as Basic 
Probability Assignment (BPA), which expresses the evidence 
attributed directly to the hypothesis. Then, D-S uses Dempster’s 
rule of combination to calculate the orthogonal summation of the 
belief values from two different sensors or observers, and fuses 
this information into a single belief. This rule is defined in (1), 
where m1(H) and m2(H) are the beliefs in the hypothesis H, from 
observers 1 and 2, respectively. ! ∩ # = % refers to all 
combinations of evidence which yield H; whereas ! ∩ # = ∅ 
refers to the mutually exclusive subsets of the hypothesis H, thus 
their intersection is the empty set. Once all the belief values have 
been fused, our IDS classifies the information according to the 
hypothesis with the highest BPA. ' % = 	 ') ! ∗ '+ #,∩-./1 − ') ! ∗ '+ #,∩-.∅ 	∀	% ≠ Ø							(1) 
B. Automatic BPA Methodology 
In [15], we proposed a novel BPA methodology able to 
automatically adapt the assignment of its evidence to the current 
characteristics of the network traffic, without intervention from 
an IDS administrator. The proposed BPA methodology exploits 
a Sliding Window (SW) scheme to compute statistical 
parameters from the data and generate the different BPA values. 
Three independent statistical approaches provide, for each 
analysed metric, the belief values on the different hypotheses. 
The approach that assigns BPA values to the hypothesis Normal 
uses the distribution of the network traffic within the SW. The 
approach that assigns BPA values to the hypothesis Attack uses 
the Euclidean distance from a defined reference of normality 
(i.e. mean of information within the SW). Meanwhile, the BPA 
in the hypothesis Uncertainty is assigned based on the belief 
values assigned to Normal and Attack in the current SW.  Once 
these values have been generated, the different BPA values are 
fused using D-S theory. The BPA in Normal and BPA in Attack 
indicate how strong the belief is that the current analysed data is 
non-malicious and malicious, respectively, whereas, the BPA in 
Uncertainty indicates how doubtful the system is regarding 
whether the current analysed data is malicious or non-malicious. 
IV. INTRUSION DETECTION METHODOLOGY 
A. Fuzzy Cognitive Map 
An FCM is a graphical representation of the modelled 
system, as perceived by different human experts. An FCM is 
able to predict the outcome of the evaluated problem by letting 
the relevant events interact, and to calculate the actual degree of 
influence that one event may have upon the system. 
The graphical representation of FCMs is characterised by a 
set of nodes interconnected by causal connections. The nodes in 
the FCM represent causal and time-varying concepts, events or 
actions that describe the behaviour of the system. Each node C 
carries a weight A(t) in the fuzzy range [0, 1], which indicates 
the quantitative measure of the importance that each concept has 
in the system, at time t. The weight A(t) is computed by the FCM 
after an iterative process. The connections between nodes 
represent the causal relationship between the concepts. Each link 
is assigned a weight value wij(t) in the fuzzy interval [-1, 1], 
which indicates the relationship and degree of influence from the 
nodes Ci to Cj. There are three possible relationships between 
nodes: 1) wij > 0, indicating a positive relationship (i.e. Aj(t) 
increases as Ai(t) also increases); 2) wij < 0, negative relationship 
(i.e. Aj(t) increases as Ai(t) decreases, and Aj(t) decreases as Ai(t) 
increases); 3) wij = 0, no relationship. 
An FCM can be represented by a [m × m] matrix M, where 
[M]ij = |wij| is known as an adjacency matrix and m is the number 
of nodes in the modelled FCM. The matrix M describes the 
relationship between the nodes and the weight values wij(t) 
associated with each link. The initial weight value A(t) of all the 
nodes in a model at time t = 0 can be represented by the initial 
vector state A, where A(0) = (A1(0), A2(0),…, Am(0)). Ai(0) is 
the weight value of node i at time t = 0. The FCMs evolve via an 
iterative process in which, at each future time step, the weight 
value of each concept A(t) is calculated by aggregating the 
influence of the interconnected concepts. This process continues 
for a number of iterations until the FCM reaches one final fixed 
model, known as a hidden pattern or fixed-point attractor. This 
is when the weight values A(t) in all the nodes do not change in 
successive iterations. It is also possible that an FCM keeps 
cycling between several fixed models, or it may continue 
generating different models indefinitely. We have empirically 
chosen the limit cycle t = 60. A more detailed description of 
FCM models can be found in [4]. 
B. BPA Adjustment Using the FCM 
The approach that we propose to incorporate contextual 
information from the PoL of the network usage is based on the 
adjustment of the BPA values assigned prior to the data fusion 
process, by using the outcome of the FCM. Once the BPA values 
have been computed as explained in Section III.B, the outcome 
of the FCM will be used to adjust these accordingly. 
The first step in the process of creating the FCM is defining 
the main concepts relevant for the detection system. In order to 
infer these concepts from the PoL, we have correlated the 
number of network users accessing the Internet with the time of 
the day and a number of network traffic metrics that characterise 
the usage of the network resources. 
In total, 14 different concepts were defined for the FCM, 
which have been sorted in Table I. The FCM concepts C1-8 
define the different ranges in which the time has been divided. 
Since the network traffic datasets used in this work have been 
collected from a network in a research office environment, it is 
expected to see an increase in the network usage during common 
office hours (i.e. from 9am to 5pm, weekdays). Nonetheless, 
there may be also high network usage outside this timeframe. In 
total, four timeframes have been defined per day. These are 00-
09h, 09-17h, 17-19h, and 19-24h, distinguishing between 
weekdays and weekends. The concepts C9-12 define three 
throughput levels that separate different levels of the network 
throughput, depending on different times of the day. These 
thresholds have been defined based on the prior knowledge of 
the network administrators. The thresholds have been defined as 
4 Mbps, 12 Mbps, and 40 Mbps. Finally, both concepts C13 = 
Normal and C14 = Abnormal are the two possible outcomes of 
the FCM. The weight values associated with both concepts are 
finally used to fine-tune the BPA values of our IDS. 
TABLE I.  LIST OF CONCEPTS FOR FCM 
FCM Concepts Concepts Definition 
C1 00 – 09 h / Weekday 
C2 09 – 17 h / Weekday 
C3 17 – 19 h / Weekday 
C4 19 – 24 h / Weekday 
C5 00 – 09 h / Weekend 
C6 09 – 17 h / Weekend 
C7 17 – 19 h / Weekend 
C8 19 – 24 h / Weekend 
C9 Throughput < 4 Mbps 
C10 4 Mbps < Throughput < 12 Mbps 
C11 12 Mbps < Throughput < 40 Mbps 
C12 Throughput > 40 Mbps 
C13 Normal 
C14 Abnormal 
The next step is to define the relationships among these 
concepts, the negative or positive influence, and assign the fuzzy 
degree of influence using the five qualitative variables {very 
low, low, medium, high, and very high}. In order to transform 
the variables to numerical degree of influence values, consider 
five linguistic variables, 7 = 5, sorted in an ascendant order of 
importance and represented by {µvl, µl, µm, µh, µvh}. Then, these 
variables are transformed to the numerical values wij(t) 
associated with each link, as explained in [10], using (2): 9: = ;7 − 127																																							(2) 
where 7 is the total number of variables, and ; is the ordinal 
number that represents the position of the respective linguistic 
variable in the list. In this example, the weights assigned to the 
variables {µvl, µl, µm, µh, µvh} would be {0.1, 0.3, 0.5, 0.7, 0.9}. 
One adjacency matrix has been defined for each network 
user, the time of the day and the usage of the network resources. 
Then, based on (3), all the adjacency matrices have been merged 
in the [14×14] adjacency matrix M shown in Fig. 1. 
= >? = 1@ A>?(B) CDC.) 						∀	E, G																		(3) 
where k is the number of adjacency matrices to be merged and 
m is the number of nodes in the modelled FCM. 
As an example of how the initial vector state A is defined, 
consider the situation in which the network traffic is evaluated 
at 12h on a weekday (C2), and the throughput reaches 10 Mbps 
(C10). In this situation, the initial state vector would be defined 
as A(0) = [0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0]. 
The value of Ai(t) changes at each iteration as described 
below in (4): 
I> B + 1 = 	K L = 	K I> B + A?> B ∗ I? BC?.)?M> 			(4) 
where Ai(t+1) isthe weight value of node Ci at time t+1, Aj(t) 
is the weight value of node Cj at time t, and wji(t) is the degree 
of influence of node Cj on node Ci. The new weight values of the 
nodes are calculated, after an iterative process, by aggregating 
the influence of the interconnected concepts using an activation 
function ƒ. In our experiments, we have used the hyperbolic 
tangent activation function, described in (5), because it produces 
a weight values Ai(t) normalised in the range [-1, 1]. Hence, this 
activation function complies to one of the requirements of the 
D-S theory, which requires that the BPA values assigned to each 
hypothesis could be any value up to 1. K L = OP − OQPOP + OQP 																																		(5) 
After all the BPA values have been adjusted using the 
outcome of the FCM, the data fusion process is carried out using 
the Dempster’s rule defined in (1) and the final decision is taken. 
It is worth noting that, although the same weight values are used 
to adjust all of the considered metrics, it is unlikely for these 
metrics to have the same BPA value. Therefore, the adjustments 
would impact each of the metrics differently. 
 
Fig. 1. Merged [14×14] adjacency matrix of the FCM composed using the 
number of network users, the time of the day and the usage of the network. 
V. TESTBED AND NETWORK TRAFFIC MEASUREMENTS 
A. Testbed LAN 
The analysed data has been gathered from a Local Area 
Network (LAN) in a research office environment, in the 
Wolfson School at Loughborough University. The PCs in two 
distinct labs are connected to the same office LAN, and these 
PCs are used by researchers daily, mostly for Internet access. 
The network data traffic generated by these PCs is used in our 
experiments as realistic background network traffic. 
Network traffic from all the PCs in the office LAN is 
mirrored and routed in the SPAN port of a Cisco switch. The 
switch aggregates the traffic from all the PCs in the office LAN 
using the SPAN port. A computer, named Netflow Collector in 
Fig. 2, has been allocated to run two software daemons: 
softflowd [16] and nfcapd [17]. Softflowd, is a flow-based 
network monitor software that receives the aggregated network 
traffic from the SPAN port and transforms it into netflow data. 
The software nfcapd, collects the netflow, stores it locally in a 
flat file system and, finally, runs a custom made script to insert 
the netflow data in a PostgreSQL database for future analysis. 
In addition, two additional PCs have been connected through 
a Netgear hub to a testbed LAN in order to implement the 
attacks: an attacker that runs Linux Ubuntu and launches the 
attack using the network mapping tool Nmap [18], and a victim 
that also runs Ubuntu and is also in charge of gathering all the 
network traffic used in our experiments. The victim PC was also 
used to accesses the Internet during the experiments. The 
attacker and the victim receive the traffic from the rest of the 
office LAN through the hub connected to the switch. Figure 2 
shows the logical topology of the testbed LAN. The left part of 
the figure represents the PCs that have generated the background 
network traffic, whereas the right part represents the Netflow 
collector and the PCs involved in the port scanning attacks. 
 
Fig. 2. Logical topology of the testbed LAN; PCs on the left generate the 
background traffic, while those on the right are involved in the port scanning 
attacks implementation, and detection process. 
B. Evaluated Network Attack 
In this paper we use a port scanning attack, also known as 
probing, to evaluate the approaches that we propose. A port 
scanning attack is one of the most popular techniques to discover 
active services with weak security in the targeted victim or well-
known vulnerabilities that could be exploited [19]. Although 
port scanning has been investigated for over a decade, this attack 
is a growing cyber-security concern due to the fact that it often 
precedes the implementation of multi-stage cyber-attacks and 
more elaborate network intrusion attempts [20]. 
To carry out the port scanning attacks that we have 
implemented in the experiments, we have used the network 
mapper Nmap. Nmap is a popular open source port scanning tool 
that provides a variety of probing techniques for network 
exploitation and security auditing. In addition to Nmap, we have 
made the implementation of the attacks easier by using the 
official Nmap GUI, Zenmap [18]. Nmap and Zenmap allow the 
implementation of different modes or profiles of the port 
scanning attack (e.g. intensive scan, slow comprehensive scan, 
or quick scan). Each of these modes of attack will manifest itself 
differently in the network as the intensity of the attack varies 
from one another. Throughout the experiments, we have 
implemented a number of these different modes. 
C. Network Traffic Measurements 
All the network traffic from the testbed LAN has been 
aggregated and gathered in pcap format using the network 
packets analyser Tcpdump [21]. In total, 160 GBytes of network 
traffic has been gathered during the 9 days that the experiment 
lasted (from 21st to 29th July 2016). This traffic dataset comprises 
99.40% of normal traffic (i.e. 696638 data instances) and 0.60% 
of malicious traffic (i.e. 4220 data instances). The dataset is 
available from https://figshare.com/s/4bd0fe2dab7e09ce61dc 
Four different metrics have been extracted directly from the 
dataset, which are used to carry out the intrusion detection 
analysis. These metrics are Communication Rate (COM), the 
number of frames transmitted per second; Throughput (THR), 
the number transmitted bytes per second; Destination Port 
Distribution (DST), the number of unique destination ports per 
second; and Source Port Distribution (SRC), the number of 
unique source ports per second. The first three metrics are 
represented in Figs. 3-5. Since the two metrics SRC and DST 
have very similar profiles, the metric SRC is not presented in 
this work. The figures present cyclic patterns in the metric 
measurements. These cycles correspond to the PoL and the time 
of the day at which the network is being utilised by more users. 
The section in blue corresponds to the non-malicious traffic, 
while the section in red corresponds to the traces of port 
scanning attacks. As we can also see, Fig. 3 includes extra 
annotations to help identify the cycles of the PoL and the traces 
of port scanning attacks. Additionally, a closer look at the day 1 
of the THR is shown in Fig. 6. On the one hand, we can 
differentiate the different PoL depending on the time of the day, 
and we can also see that the traces of port scanning attack could 
not be easily identified by using a simple signature or threshold. 
 
Fig. 3. COM- Communication Rate (number of transmitted frames / second) 
collected over 9 days. 
 
Fig. 4. DST- Destination Ports Distribution (number of unique destination 
ports per second) collected over 9 days. 
Although, it would also be expected that the network 
resource usage would increase when the attack is implemented, 
this is not always the case. As we can see in Figs. 3-6, there are 
some attack instances that standout from the normal traffic, and 
are easily differentiable. These instances coincide with the 
implementation of the intensive scan profile of the port scanning 
attack, which transmits a very large number of probing frames 
in a short period of time. In contrast, when the port scanning 
attack is implemented in a stealth manner (e.g. slow scan), the 
port scanning attack is not clearly distinguishable from the 
normal traffic by the use of the selected metrics. This will cause 
a number of misclassifications during the detection process. 
 
Fig. 5. THR- Throughput (transmitted bytes per second) collected over 9 days. 
 
Fig. 6. THR- Throughput (transmitted bytes per second) collected over 9 days. 
VI. RESULTS 
This section describes the detection results, and compares 
the results generated by our anomaly-based IDS with and 
without the use of an FCM. The main purpose of the results is to 
evidence that the use of contextual information improves the 
detection capabilities of our anomaly-based IDS. 
The effectiveness of the IDS has been evaluated using four 
well-known parameters, True Positive (TP), True Negative 
(TN), False Positive (FP), and False Negative (FN). These 
parameters are essential to calculate the following performance 
metrics, which quantify the effectiveness of the IDSs: Detection 
Rate (DR), which is the proportion of anomalies correctly 
classified among the anomalous data; False Positive Rate (FPr), 
which is the proportion of normal data misclassified among all 
the data; and Overall Success Rate (OSR), which is the 
proportion of all the data correctly classified among all the data. 
As previously explained in Section III, our IDS exploits a 
SW scheme to compute the BPA values. We have empirically 
set the SW length to 50 slots. The experimental results are 
presented in the form of bar charts, in Figs. 7-9. The dataset has 
been analysed for all the possible combinations of metrics. The 
Y-axis of the graphs represents the results in percentage, while 
the X-axis of the graphs represents the index of the used metrics. 
Each index corresponds to one possible combination of metrics, 
with #1 being a single metric set and #15 the set that combines 
all the considered metrics. Therefore, the overall best results are 
to be expected from the set index #15. The indexes of all the 
possible combinations of metrics are presented in Table II. 
TABLE II.  INDEX OF THE COMBINATION OF METRICS 
1 – DST 6 – THR-DST 11 – THR-SRC-DST 
2 – SRC 7 – THR-SRC 12 – CON-SRC-DST 
3 – THR 8 – COM-DST 13 – COM-THR-DST 
4 – COM 9 – COM-SRC 14 – COM-THR-SRC 
5 – SRC-DST 10 – COM-THR 15 – COM-THR-SRC-DST 
In the literature, the most frequently used performance 
metrics to evaluate the effectiveness of the IDSs are the DR and 
the FPr. The DR results of the IDS with and without the use of 
an FCM are compared in Fig. 7. As we can see, with regards to 
the DR, there is no evident difference between the two methods, 
using similar combination of metrics. Although, the DR is 
always higher when the contextual information is taken into 
consideration, the difference between the two methods is only 
~2%. On top of that, the DR decreases as the number of fused 
metrics increases, which is in contrast to what is expected from 
cross-layer IDSs. In our experiments, this phenomenon is caused 
by the automatic BPA methodology and the way the SW slides. 
When multiple metrics are used, the reference of normality in 
the BPA methodology becomes larger over time. Hence, the IDS 
becomes less sensitive and more malicious instances are 
misclassified as non-malicious. Nonetheless, as the OSR results 
will show, this phenomenon also leads to an increase in the 
number of non-malicious instances correctly classified. 
 
Fig. 7. Detection Rate results comparison between the methodologies: FCM 
in conjunction with IDS, and the IDS without FCM. 
The FPr results of our IDS with and without the use of an 
FCM are compared in Fig. 8. In contrast to the DR results, we 
can see that the use of FCM actually outperforms the FPr results 
produced by the IDS alone. For instance, for the set #3 (THR), 
the difference between the two methods is over 35%. The largest 
difference for all the sets that combine two metrics is obtained 
in #10 (COM-THR), where the difference is 27.82%. Among the 
sets that combine three metrics, the largest FPr difference is 
obtained in #14 (COM-THR-SRC), where the difference is 
17.15%. When all the metrics are combined, the difference 
between the two methods is over 9.68%. This clear improvement 
is constant for all the combinations of metrics. Also, the set of 
metrics #15 is the one that produces the best FPr (i.e. the lowest 
FPr) results, only 6.33%. In addition, the FPr decreases as the 
number of fused metrics increases. This behaviour is similar to 
the case of DR, where the DR decreases as the number of fused 
metrics increases. Ideally, we would prefer to see decrease in the 
FPr and an increase in the DR, at the same time. However, this 
is not the case. This behaviour can be associated with the 
tradeoff in network intrusion detection described in [22]. The 
authors explain that there exists a tradeoff between the reduction 
of the FPs by decreasing the sensitivity of the IDS and the 
increase of the number of malicious instances misclassified. 
 
Fig. 8. False Positive Rate results comparison between two methodologies: 
FCM in conjunction with IDS, and the IDS without FCM. 
The final performance metric that we have used is the OSR. 
This is a metric that has been commonly overlooked in the 
literature. In contrast to the DR that is only based on the 
malicious content of the analysed data, the OSR represents all 
the instances that have been correctly classified, regardless of 
whether these are malicious or not. Therefore, the OSR provides 
a more representative understanding of the efficiency of the IDS. 
 
Fig. 9. Overall Success Rate results comparison between two methodologies: 
FCM in conjunction with IDS, and the IDS without FCM. 
Figure 9 presents the OSR results comparison between the 
two methodologies. Similar to the case of FPr, the use of FCM 
in conjunction with IDS outperforms the OSR results produced 
by the IDS without FCM. For the set #3 (THR) the improvement 
in the OSR between the two methods is 35.64%. The largest 
improvement in all the sets that combine two metrics is obtained 
in #10 (COM-THR), where the difference between the two 
methods is 27.38%. Among the sets that combine three metrics, 
the largest OSR improvement is obtained in #14 (COM-THR-
SRC), where the difference is 17.15%. And finally, when all the 
metrics are combined, the difference between the two methods 
is over 9.68% of improvement. This improvement is constant for 
all the combinations of metrics, and shows once more that the 
use of contextual information improves the detection 
capabilities of our anomaly-based IDS. Again, the set of metrics 
#15 is the one that produces the best OSR (i.e. the highest OSR) 
results, 93.19%. These results show that, although less malicious 
instances are correctly classified, more non-malicious instances 
are correctly classified as more metrics are combined. 
VII. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
In this paper we advocate incorporating high-level 
information regarding the monitored network, in the form of 
PoL, when taking decisions on whether an attack is present in 
the network traffic. The methodology is based on the use of an 
FCM in conjunction with our IDS. 
The analysed dataset was gathered from a real LAN in a 
research office environment. During 9 days, network traffic was 
gathered, which comprises non-malicious traffic and traces of 
port scanning attacks. Different profiles of the attack have been 
implemented throughout the experiments, which manifest 
themselves differently in the network as the intensity of the 
attacks varies from one another. The fact that we have combined 
different profiles of the attack makes the detection process 
challenging. The intensive scan profiles standout from the 
normal traffic and are easily differentiable, whereas the stealth 
scan profile is not clearly distinguishable from the normal 
traffic. This causes a large number of misclassifications during 
the detection process. 
From the presented DR results, we could argue that the IDS 
or the selected network metrics are not effective in detecting port 
scanning attacks. By using all the considered metrics, the IDS 
reaches just under 20% of DR. Also, the proposed methodology 
provides an improvement to the DR results of only ~2%. 
Nonetheless, we ought to consider also the FPr and, more 
importantly, the OSR. The OSR represents the total number of 
instances correctly classified, providing a more representative 
understanding of the efficiency of the IDS. With regards to these 
two performance metrics, it is evident that the use of contextual 
information constantly improves the detection capabilities of our 
IDS, for all the possible combinations of metrics. The proposed 
methodology is able to produce only 6.33% of FPr, and up to 
93.19% of OSR, in the best-case scenario. These results 
empirically confirm that the use of FCM improves the detection 
capabilities of the IDS, which is the main objective of this work. 
As for future work, a possible integration of the Service 
Level Agreement and Quality of Service policies could assist in 
enhancing the expert understanding of the expected network 
behaviour under various contexts and situation conditions. Also, 
we wish to implement a novel, seamless mechanism to extract 
the available high-level information used to construct the FCM, 
or to refine the leverage of the different thresholds that 
characterise the various concepts in the FCM model. 
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